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Abstract
The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar-
tin Escardo´ and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move
simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria
of finite games is generalised to games defined by selection functions. A
normal form construction is given which generalises the game-theoretic
normal form, and its soundness is proven. Minimax strategies also gener-
alise to the new class of games and are computed by the Berardi-Bezem-
Coquand functional, studied in proof theory as an interpretation of the
axiom of countable choice.
1 Introduction
The notion of optimisation is common to many areas of applied mathematics,
such as game theory and linear and nonlinear programming. Typically we have
a set X of choices and a function p mapping each x ∈ X to a real number p(x),
which we might call the value or cost of x. From this we can define a natural
notion of optimality: a point y ∈ R is optimal just if y ≥ p(x) for all x ∈ X and
y = p(x0) for some x0 ∈ X . We usually refer to y by a notation such as
y = max
x∈X
p(x)
The point x0 is also interesting: it is a point at which p attains its optimal
value, and we refer to it as
x0 = argmax
x∈X
p(x)
(Of course, while y is guaranteed to be unique when it exists, x0 is not neces-
sarily unique; we only require that argmax chooses some value for x0.) These
notations are connected by the equation y = p(x0), or
max
x∈X
p(x) = p
(
argmax
x∈X
p(x)
)
Suppose we fix the set X and assume that maxx∈X p(x) exists for all func-
tions p : X → R (as when X is finite, for example). We can now define a
function by
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
p(x)
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ϕ has range R, and its domain is the function set X → R, that is, the set of all
functions with domain X and range R. We therefore write
ϕ : (X → R)→ R
We call ϕ a higher-order function, that is, a function whose domain is itself a
set of functions. We can also define
ε(p) = argmax
x∈X
p(x)
obtaining a higher-order function
ε : (X → R)→ X
satisfying
ϕ(p) = p(ε(p)) for all p : X → R
Using the concept of a higher-order function we can make a large generali-
sation of the properties of max and argmax. For any sets X and R, a function
ϕ : (X → R)→ R will be called a quantifier and a function ε : (X → R)→ X
will be called a selection function. We say that ε attains ϕ just if ϕ(p) = p(ε(p))
for all p : X → R. max and argmax become the prototypical examples of a
quantifier and a selection function attaining it. A very different example of a
quantifier is a fixed point operator µ : (X → X) → X which has the prop-
erty that µ(p) is always a fixed point of p, that is, µ(p) = p(µ(p)). Thus a
fixed point operator attains itself. Quantifiers where R is the set of truth-values
appear naturally in logic. These concepts were introduced and applied to the
theory of sequential games by Martin Escardo´ and Paulo Oliva in a series of
papers summarised in (Escardo´ and Oliva 2011).
What is a game? Typically, some players take turns choosing between sets
of legal moves, which may be constrained by previous players’ moves. The
sequence of moves made by the players is called a play of the game. Usually,
the rules of the game guarantee that every play terminates after a finite number
of moves, and then uniquely determine which player has won the play.
In the theory of games as introduced by (von Neumann and Morgenstern
1944) the notion of a player winning a play is not used. Rather, for each player
the rules of the game define an outcome function mapping each play of the game
to a real number called the utility of the play for that player. This generalisation
is important for applications of game theory to economics, where utility often
represents profit. In the game played by two competing firms, for example,
each firm is interested in maximising its own profit, and does not care (in the
short term, at least) how much profit its competitor makes. Of course, a firm’s
profits will be affected by the moves of its competitor, and vice versa. A central
problem of game theory is to determine which moves each player should choose
in order to maximise their utility. The theory of games as surveyed for example
in (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) will be referred to as classical game theory.
Suppose during the course of a play some player must choose between some
set X of moves. Taking the usual assumption of common knowledge of ratio-
nality (that is, the players play optimally, and they know that each other will
play optimally, and so on) the future of the play after making each choice of
x ∈ X is sufficiently well determined that a utility p(x) ∈ R can be assigned
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to each x ∈ X . In classical game theory, a rational player will always choose
argmaxx∈X p(x). By replacing R with an arbitrary set R and argmax with an
arbitrary selection function ε : (X → R) → X , a rich theory of generalised
games results, with deep connections to proof theory and theoretical computer
science (Escardo´ and Oliva 2010b, Escardo´ et al. 2011).
The games which have been described so far are the so-called sequential
games. In the more usual language of classical game theory this can be read as
non-branching extensive form games of perfect information. However there are
games which cannot be described as a sequence of moves. These are the so-called
simultaneous games, or games of imperfect information. A well known example
is rock-paper-scissors; a more important example is the simultaneous pricing of
goods by supermarkets. von Neumann and Morgenstern proved that every game
can be described as a simultaneous game, called its normal or strategic form.
The central idea of this proof is that players simultaneously choose contingent
strategies, higher-order functions which choose the next move given the play up
to that point, and so play the game on behalf of the player. In this paper we
consider a notion of simultaneous games that encompasses Escardo´ and Oliva’s
generalised sequential games in a similar way.
In section 3, generalised simultaneous games and their appropriate notion of
equilibrium are defined. In section 4 a class of games, the so-called multilinear
games, is defined, and it is proven that games of this kind always have an
equilibrium (theorem 2). This is used in section 5 to prove the key result of this
paper (theorem 3), a natural generalisation of Nash’s theorem for the existence
of mixed-strategy equilibria to games defined by arbitrary quantifiers. In section
6 a mapping from sequential to simultaneous games is defined analagous to the
normal form construction in the classical theory, and its soundness is proven
(theorem 5). In section 7 we show an interesting connection to proof theory,
namely that the binary Barardi-Bezem-Coquand functional computes minimax
strategies of games, a result that suggests a deeper connection between proof
theory and generalised games.
2 Preliminaries
If X and Y are sets then X → Y denotes the set of all functions with domain
X and range Y (this is often denoted Y X , a notation we avoid in order to avoid
writing exponential towers for higher-order functions). Cartesian products of
sets are denoted
∏
and bind tighter then →, so for example
∏
i∈I Xi → R
means (
∏
i∈I Xi)→ R. The ith coordinate projection of a tuple π ∈
∏
i∈I Xi is
denoted πi.
The following piece of notation, for manipulating products, will be helpful.
Let I be a set and let Xi be a set for each i ∈ I. If x ∈ Xi and π ∈
∏
j∈I Xj
then we define π(i 7→ x) ∈
∏
j∈I Xj by
(π(i 7→ x))j =
{
x if i = j
πj otherwise
We make use of Church’s λ-notation for describing functions anonymously.
The function which might otherwise be written as x 7→ 1 + x will be denoted
λxN.1 + x, where N is the domain of the anonymous function. For example we
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have (λxN.1+ x)(42) = 43. A variable bound by a λ need not appear under the
scope of the λ, for example λxX .42 is the constant function with the property
that (λxX .42)(x′) = 42 for all x′ ∈ X .
A quantifier is a function ϕ ∈ SR(X) where SR(X) = (X → R)→ P(R), a
definition introduced in (Escardo´ and Oliva 2011). The domain of a quantifier
is
dom(ϕ) = {p ∈ X → R | ϕ(p) 6= ∅}
A quantifier with dom(ϕ) = X → R will be called total.
A selection function is a function ε ∈ JR(X) where JR(X) = (X → R)→ X .
Selection functions were first introduced in (Escardo´ and Oliva 2010a). The
quantifier ϕ ∈ SR(X) is attained by the selection function ε ∈ JR(X) just if
p(ε(p)) ∈ ϕ(p)
for all p ∈ dom(ϕ). This definition of attainment differs from Escardo´ and
Oliva’s, who require the condition to hold for all p ∈ X → R. For a total
quantifier (which are considered in section 5, and to which the main theorem
applies) the two definitions coincide.
For example, if R = R and X is compact then the extreme value theorem
(plus the axiom of choice) implies that the maximum quantifier
ϕ(p) =
{
{maxx∈X p(x)} if p is continuous
∅ otherwise
is attained. (Note that we need the axiom of choice to collect all the values into
a single function.) A quantifier such as this whose values have cardinality at
most 1 will be called single-valued. Since the definition of ϕ is clumsy we can
use a new notation for single-valued quantifiers, such as
ϕ(p) = max
x∈X
p(x)
∣∣∣∣
p is continuous
We assume some point-set topology as covered, for example, in (Kelley 1955)
and elementary properties of topological vector spaces (Conway 1990). All topo-
logical vector spaces are assumed to be T1 throughout (this is no loss of general-
ity because quotienting a topological vector space by the closure of {0} always
yields a Hausdorff space). For reference, a subset S of a real vector space is
called convex iff for all x, y ∈ S and t ∈ [0, 1] we have tx+ (1 − t)y ∈ S.
In part 4 we work with the class of locally convex spaces. The definition of
a locally convex space is technical and not necessary for our purposes; beyond
theorem 1 and lemma 2 we only need to know that every locally convex space is a
topological vector space. Every normed vector space is locally convex; examples
of locally convex spaces which are not normable include the spaces of smooth
functions C∞(R) and C∞([0, 1]) and the space of real-valued sequences Rω with
convergence defined pointwise. Locally convex spaces are covered in detail in
(Conway 1990).
A note on foundations. It is possible to define generalised sequential
games over models other than classical set theory. Indeed, as explained in
(Escardo´ and Oliva 2011) it is sometimes necessary to work in nonstandard
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models, for example when considering unbounded sequential games (which are
not considered in this paper). JR is a (strong) monad and can be defined over
any cartesian closed category (moreover the closely related KR(X) = (X →
R) → R, which contains the total single-valued quantifiers, is already well-
known from programming language theory where it is called the continuation
monad). The definitions of generalised simultaneous game and abstract Nash
equilibrium could be formalised in a more general setting, but the proofs in
section 4 use classical set theory in an essential way, so we find it easier to avoid
foundational issues altogether and work entirely in classical set theory.
3 Generalised simultaneous games
In this section we define the objects studied in this paper, namely generalised
simultaneous games and generalised Nash equilibria. The definition of a gener-
alised simultaneous game comes from the classical definition of a normal-form
game, but with the maximising behaviour of players replaced with a specified
quantifier. For the general definition we do not require the number of players
to be finite. The related notion of generalised sequential game will be defined
in section 6.
Definition 1 (Generalised simultanous game). A generalised simultaneous game
(with multiple outcome spaces), denoted simply game when not ambiguous, is a
tuple
G = (I, (Xi, Ri, qi, ϕi)i∈I)
where I is a nonempty set of players, and for each i ∈ I,
• Xi is a nonempty set of moves for player i;
• Ri is a set of outcomes for player i;
• qi ∈ S → Ri is the outcome function for player i, where S =
∏
j∈I Xj is
the strategy space of G;
• ϕi ∈ SRi(Xi) is the quantifier for player i.
We say that G has a single outcome space if the Ri are equal and the qi are
equal. In this case G is determined by a tuple
G = (I, (Xi)i∈I , R, q, (ϕi)i∈I)
where q ∈ S → R.
An element x ∈ Xi is called a strategy for player i for G. A tuple π ∈ S is
called a strategy profile for G. Throughout this paper the variables π, σ and τ
will range over strategies of a game.
In general we need games with multiple outcome spaces to study simulta-
neous games, and in particular to recover the classical Nash theorem. However
normal forms of generalised sequential games will always have single outcome
space.
The appropriate notion of equilibrium of a generalised simultaneous game
is called a generalised Nash equilibrium. Before making this definition, we first
define some notation used throughout this paper. Firstly we define the family of
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unilateral maps U iq, which are used as a shorthand notation but, when considered
as a higher-order functions, are also natural and interesting in their own right.
Definition 2 (Unilateral map). Let I be a set, and for each i ∈ I let Xi and
Ri be sets. Let q = (qi)i∈I be a family of maps such that each
qi ∈
∏
j∈I
Xj → Ri
We define the ith unilateral map
U iq ∈
∏
j∈I
Xj → (Xi → Ri)
by
U iq(π)(x) = qi(π(i 7→ x))
Thus, the ith unilateral map computes the outcomes of unilateral changes of
strategy by the ith player in a game. Secondly, we associate to every quantifier
a set called its diagonal.
Definition 3 (Diagonal of a quantifier). Let ϕ ∈ SR(X) be a quantifier. The
diagonal of ϕ is
∆(ϕ) = {(p, x) ∈ (X → R)×X | p(x) ∈ ϕ(p)}
Now the equilibria of a generalised simultaneous game can be defined in a
very compact and (as will be seen) useful way.
Definition 4 (Generalised Nash equilibrium). Let G be a game with strategy
space S. We define the best response correspondence B ∈ S → P(S) of G by
B(π) =
⋂
i∈I
Bi(π)
where the Bi ∈ S → P(S) are defined by
Bi(π) = {σ ∈ S | (U
i
q(π), σi) ∈ ∆(ϕi)}
A generalised Nash equilibrium of G is a fixed point of B, that is, a strategy
profile π such that π ∈ B(π).
Unpacking this definition, we see that π is a generalised Nash equilibrium of
G iff for each i ∈ I we have
qi(π) ∈ ϕi(λx
Xi .qi(π(i 7→ x)))
When Xi is compact, qi is continuous and ϕi is the quantifier
ϕi(p) = max
x∈Xi
p(x)
∣∣∣∣
p is continuous
this reduces to
qi(π) = max
x∈Xi
qi(π(i 7→ x))
which is the usual definition of a Nash equilibrium.
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4 Multilinear games
Now we define a large family of games, called the multilinear games, that are
guaranteed to have a generalised Nash equilibrium. The structure of the ar-
gument is the same as that in (Nash 1950b), but given in more generality to
deal with more general quantifiers. This section can be seen as a series of lem-
mas that are eventually used to prove theorem 3 (the generalisation of Nash’s
theorem) in the next section.
Definition 5 (Closed graph property). Let X and Y be topological spaces and
F ∈ X → P(Y ). We say that F has the closed graph property iff
Γ(F ) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y ∈ F (x)}
is closed with respect to the product topology.
The closed graph property is a form of continuity for functions whose range
is a set of subsets of a topological space.
In order to guarantee that a generalised simultaneous game will have an
equilibrium we need to impose closed graph properties on the quantifiers. How-
ever the domain of a quantifier is a function set, which in general has no unique
natural topology. The least we need is that the unilateral maps are continuous,
and so for this reason we define the unilateral topology.
Definition 6 (Unilateral topology). For each i ∈ I let Xi and Ri be topological
spaces with qi ∈ Xi → Ri continuous. The unilateral topology on Xi → Ri is
the final topology with respect to the singleton family {U iq}, that is, it is the largest
topology with respect to which U iq is continuous. A function which is continuous
with respect to the unilateral topology will be called unilaterally continuous, and
a function which has closed graph with respect to the unilateral topology has
unilaterally closed graph.
Another possible topology on Xi → Ri which will be useful is the topology
of pointwise convergence. Most of this paper could be formulated using only
pointwise convergence, except for an interesting example at the end of this
section which needs a finer topology, namely uniform convergence.
Lemma 1. The unilateral topology is finer than the topology of pointwise con-
vergence.
Proof. It must be proven that U iq is continuous with respect to the topology of
pointwise convergence. Let πj −→ π be a convergent sequence in
∏
j∈I Xj , and
let x ∈ Xi. We have
πj(i 7→ x) −→ π(i 7→ x)
in the product topology, so
U iq(πj)(x) = qi(πj(i 7→ x)) −→ qi(π(i 7→ x)) = U
i
q(π)(x)
because qi is continuous. Therefore U
i
q(πj) −→ U
i
q(π) pointwise, as required.
Now we can give the definition of a multilinear game. This definition essen-
tially contains the least assumptions needed for Nash’s proof.
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Definition 7 (Multilinear game). A game G = (I, (Xi, Ri, qi, ϕi)i∈I) is called
multilinear iff
• Each Xi is a compact and convex subset of a given locally compact space
Vi over R;
• Each Ri is a topological vector space over R;
• Each qi extends to a continuous multilinear map
qi ∈
∏
j∈I
Vj → Ri
(that is, qi is linear with respsect to each Vj separately);
• Each ϕi has unilaterally closed graph, ϕi(p) is closed and convex for all
p ∈ Xi → Ri, and dom(ϕi) ⊇ im(U
i
q).
(Note that because qi is continuous and multilinear, to satisfy the last con-
dition it suffices that ϕi(p) 6= ∅ whenever p is continuous and linear. Note also
that if ϕi is single-valued then each ϕi(p) is automatically closed and convex.)
The idea of the existence proof is to reduce to the following fixed point
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem (Fan 1952, Glicksberg
1952)). Let S be a nonempty, compact and convex subset of a locally convex
space over R. Let B ∈ S → P(S) have closed graph and let B(π) be nonempty,
closed and convex for all π ∈ S. Then B has a fixed point.
We will need to use the fact that locally convex spaces are closed under
arbitrary products.
Lemma 2. Let {Vi}i∈I be a family of locally convex spaces over a field K. Then∏
i∈I Xi has the strucutre of a locally convex space over K whose topology is the
product topology.
Much of the usefulness of multilinear games comes down to the fact that
their unilateral maps are well-behaved.
Lemma 3. Let G be a multilinear game with strategy space S. Then each U iq is
a continuous function
U iq ∈ S ×Xi → Ri
(under the Curry bijection A→ (B → C) ∼= A× B → C) which is linear in its
second argument.
Proof. By the continuity and multilinearity of the qi.
Lemmas 4-8 form the core of the proof, establishing the hypotheses of the
Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem.
Lemma 4. Let G be a multilinear game. Then the strategy space of G is a
nonempty, compact and convex subset of a locally convex space.
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Proof. The strategy space is
S =
∏
i∈I
Xi ⊆
∏
i∈I
Vi
where the larger space is locally convex by lemma 2.
S is nonempty by the axiom of choice and compact by Tychonoff’s theorem.
Convexivity is also inherited by the product, since for each i ∈ I we have
(tx + (1− t)y)i = txi + (1− t)yi ∈ Xi
Lemma 5. Let G be a multilinear game with best response correspondence B
such that each quantifier ϕi is attained by a selection function εi. Then B(π)
is nonempty for all π.
Proof. Let S be the strategy space of G. Given π ∈ S we define σ ∈ S to have
ith component
σi = εi(U
i
q(π))
Since εi attains ϕi and U
i
q(π) ∈ dom(ϕi) we have
U iq(π)(εi(U
i
q(π))) ∈ ϕi(U
i
q(π))
Therefore
(U iq(π), σi) = (U
i
q(π), εi(U
i
q(π))) ∈ ∆(ϕi)
so σ ∈ B(π), as required.
Lemma 6. Let G be a multilinear game with best response correspondence B.
Then B(π) is closed for all π.
Proof. It suffices to prove that each factor
Bi(π) = {σ ∈ S | (U
i
q(π), σi) ∈ ∆(ϕi)}
is closed. Let σj −→ σ be a convergent sequence in Bi(π). For each i we have
σj,i −→ σi, so
U iq(π)(σj,i) −→ U
i
q(π)(σi)
by the continuity of U iq. We also have that each
U iq(π)(σj,i) ∈ ϕi(U
i
q(π))
and the right hand side is closed by definition, therefore
U iq(π)(σi) ∈ ϕi(U
i
q(π))
that is,
(U iq(π), σi) ∈ ∆(ϕi)
Lemma 7. Let G be a multilinear game with best response correspondence B.
Then B(π) is convex for all π.
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Proof. Suppose σ, τ ∈ B(π) and t ∈ [0, 1]. Let i ∈ I. By definition we have
U iq(π)(σi),U
i
q(π)(τi) ∈ ϕi(U
i
q(π))
Since the linearity of U iq we have
U iq(π)(tσi + (1− t)τi) = tU
i
q(π)(σi) + (1− t)U
i
q(π)(τi)
Since the ϕi(p) are convex, we have
U iq(π)(tσi + (1− t)τi) ∈ ϕi(U
i
q(π))
that is,
(U iq(π), tσi + (1 − t)τi) ∈ ∆(ϕi)
Therefore
tσ + (1− t)τ ∈ B(π)
Lemma 8. Let G be a multilinear game with best response correspondence B.
Then B has closed graph.
Proof. Note that
Γ(B) =
⋂
i∈I
{(σ, π) ∈ S2 | (U iq(π),U
i
q(π)(σi)) ∈ Γ(ϕi)}
and so it suffices to prove these factors closed. Let (σj , πj) −→ (σ, π) be a
convergent sequence in the ith factor. By the continuity of U iq,
U iq(πj)(σj,i) −→ U
i
q(π)(σi)
Since U iq is also unilaterally continuous as a map S → (Xi → Ri), we have
U iq(πj) −→ U
i
q(π) unilaterally. Therefore we have a convergent sequence
(U iq(πj),U
i
q(πj)(σj,i)) −→ (U
i
q(π),U
i
q(π)(σi))
in the graph Γ(ϕi), which is closed by definition.
Theorem 2 (Existence theorem for multilinear games). Let G be a multilinear
game such that each quantifier is attained by a selection function. Then G has
a generalised Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let B be the best response correspondence of G. By lemmas 4-8 and the
Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem, B a fixed point.
Examples of multilinear games as mixed extensions of finite games are given
in the next section. Another interesting example is given by integration. Let
Xi = [0, 1], Vi = R and Ri = R, and let L(Xi) be the set of all Lebesgue-
integrable functions p ∈ [0, 1]→ R with∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
p(x) dx
∣∣∣∣ <∞
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Define a single-valued quantifier ϕi ∈ SRXi by
ϕi(p) =
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx
∣∣∣∣
p∈L(Xi)
Using the mean value theorem (and the axiom of choice) we can prove the
existence of a selection function attaining ϕi: for all p ∈ L(Xi) there exists
εi(p) ∈ Xi such that
p(εi(p)) =
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx
This highly nonconstructive selection function was briefly introduced as an ex-
ample in (Escardo´ and Oliva 2010a).
We let I be finite and for simplicity let the other Xj be normed, so the
strategy space is normed and we can work with the ε− δ definitions of uniform
convergence and continuity.
Lemma 9. If qi is uniformly continuous and πj −→ π then U
i
q(πj) −→ U
i
q(π)
uniformly.
Proof. We have that qi is uniformly continuous, that is,
∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀π, σ ∈
∏
j∈I
Xj . |π − σ| < δ =⇒ |qi(π) − qi(σ)| < ε (1)
We also have πj −→ π, that is,
∀ε > 0 ∃N ∀j ≥ N. |πj − π| < ε (2)
We want to prove that U iq(πj) −→ U
i
q(π) uniformly, that is,
∀ε > 0 ∃N ∀j ≥ N ∀x ∈ Xi. |U
i
q(πj)(x) − U
i
q(π)(x)| < ε
Let ε > 0. By (1), we have δ > 0 with the given property. We take ε in (2)
to be this δ, obtaining N . Let j ≥ N , therefore
|πj − π| < δ
by (2). Let x ∈ X . The crucial observation is that πj(i 7→ x) behaves like πj
but is constant in its ith coordinate. That is, we have
|πj(i 7→ x)− π(i 7→ x)| ≤ |πj − π| < δ
Now we take π, σ in (1) to be πj(i 7→ x) and π(i 7→ x). We have already
proved the antecedent in (1), therefore
|U iq(πj)(x) − U
i
q(π)(x)| = |qi(πj(i 7→ x)) − qi(π(i 7→ x))| < ε
as required.
We have proven that the unilateral topology is finer than the topology of
uniform convergence.
Lemma 10. ϕi is unilaterally continuous.
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Proof. Suppose we have pj −→ p uniformly in L(Xi). Since the convergence of
the integrands is uniform, we can apply the uniform convergence theorem to get
ϕi(pj) =
∫ 1
0
pj(x) dx −→
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx = ϕi(p)
Since the unilateral topology is finer than the topology of uniform convergence,
we are done.
In the 1-player game defined by the integration quantifier with outcome
function q, the unique value of q(x) when x is an equilibrium strategy, which
can be called the expected outcome of the game, is simply∫ 1
0
q(x) dx
In the 2-player game with both quantifiers integrals, a generalised Nash equi-
librium (a, b) satisfies
a =
∫ 1
0
qX(x, b) dx b =
∫ 1
0
qY (a, y) dy
Since
∫ 1
0
p(x) dx is the average value of p, this is a game where players are trying
to gain the average outcome rather than the maximum. The existence of a Nash
equilibrium in this case can be more directly proven by applying the Brouwer
fixed point theorem to the mapping
[0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2, (a, b) 7→
(∫ 1
0
qX(x, b) dx,
∫ 1
0
qY (a, y) dy
)
5 Finite games
In this section we apply the existence theorem for multilinear games to prove
a suitable generalisation of Nash’s theorem. The classical version of Nash’s
theorem guarantees that every finite game (that is, a classical game in which
each player has finitely many strategies) has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The notion of mixed strategies means that we consider probably distributions
over ordinary strategies (referred to as pure strategies for clarity). The outcome
functions also need to be replaced by expected outcome functions. However
the discussion of probability distributions can be avoided by treating them as
geometric objects, namely simplices. This approach also makes it clearer how
quantifiers and selection functions must be modified when passing to mixed
strategies. A probabilistic interpretation of the resulting theorem is possible,
but is avoided in this paper.
Definition 8 (Finite game). A game G = (I, (Xi, Ri, qi, ϕi)i∈I) is called finite
iff
• I is finite;
• Each Xi is finite;
• Each Ri is a topological vector space over R;
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• Each ϕi is total, has closed graph with respect to the topology of pointwise
convergence, and ϕi(p) is closed and convex for all p ∈ Xi → Ri.
Note that restricting to pointwise convergence is no loss of generality here
because the Xi are finite.
The set of probability distributions over a finite set can be seen as a geometric
object called a standard simplex. In 2 and 3 dimensions these can be easily
visualised as a line segment and an equilateral triangle; the next simplex ∆4 is
a tetrahedron seen as a subset of R4.
Definition 9 (Standard simplex). The nth standard simplex is the set
∆n = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n |
n∑
i=1
xi = 1 and each xi ≥ 0}
Definition 10 (Mixed extension). Let G = (I, (Xi, Ri, qi, ϕi)i∈I) be a finite
game with strategy space S. We define a game
G∗ = (I, (X∗i , Ri, q
∗
i , ϕ
∗
i )i∈I)
called the mixed extension of G as follows: player i has move set
X∗i = ∆|Xi|
outcome function
q∗i (π) =
∑
σ∈S
(∏
i∈I
πi,σi
)
(qi(σ))
and quantifier
ϕ∗i (p) = ϕi(p ◦ δi)
where δi is the canonical injection Xi →֒ X
∗
i mapping each j to the vertex of
the simplex at which the jth coordinate is 1.
Note that the finiteness of I is used only in the well-definition of the q∗i : for
the strategy space S to be finite it is necessary that I be finite, except in trivial
cases when all but finitely many Xi are singletons.
Definition 11 (Mixed strategy abstract Nash equilibrium). Let G be a finite
game. A strategy profile for G∗ will be called a mixed strategy profile for G. An
abstract Nash equilibrium of G∗ will be called a mixed strategy abstract Nash
equilibrium of G.
The most important property of mixed extensions is that they are always
multilinear. This will used to prove the generalised Nash theorem.
Lemma 11. Let G be a finite game. Then G∗ is a multilinear game.
Proof. Each ∆n for n > 0 is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of the
13
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locally convex space Rn. Continuity of the q∗i is clear. q
∗
i is multilinear because
U iq∗(π)(cx + y)
= q∗(π(i 7→ cx+ y))
=
∑
σ∈S
∏
j 6=i
πj,σj
 · (cxσi + yσi)
 (q(σ))
= c
∑
σ∈S
∏
j 6=i
πj,σj
 · xσi
 (q(σ)) +∑
σ∈S
∏
j 6=i
πj,σj
 · yσi
 (q(σ))
= cq∗(π(i 7→ x)) + q∗(π(i 7→ y))
= cU iq∗(π)(x) + U
i
q∗(π)(y)
The ϕ∗i (p) are of the form ϕi(p
′), and so are closed and convex. We note
that ϕ∗i is total because ϕi is. The graph of ϕ
∗
i is
Γ(ϕ∗i ) = {(p, y) ∈ (X
∗
i → Ri)×Ri | (p ◦ δi, y) ∈ Γ(ϕi)}
Suppose we have a convergent sequence (pj , yj) −→ (p, y) in Γ(ϕ
∗
i ). Let x ∈ X ,
then
(pj ◦ δi)(x) = pj(δi(x)) −→ p(δi(x)) = (p ◦ δi)(x)
Therefore pj ◦ δi −→ p ◦ δi pointwise, so
(pj ◦ δi, yj) −→ (p ◦ δi, y)
with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence. Since the unilateral
topology is finer than the topology of pointwise convergence, we are done.
The final result we need is the ability to lift selection functions to mixed
extensions.
Lemma 12. Let X be a nonempty finite set and let ϕ ∈ SRX be a total quan-
tifier attained by the selection function ε ∈ JRX. Then there exists a selection
function ε∗ such that ϕ∗ is attained by ε∗.
Proof. We define ε∗ ∈ JR∆|X| by the equation
ε∗(p) = δ(ε(p ◦ δ))
where δ : X →֒ ∆|X|. Then
p(ε∗(p)) = p(ι(ε(p ◦ ι)) = (p ◦ ι)(ε(p ◦ ι)) ∈ ϕ(p ◦ ι) = ϕ∗(p)
for all p ∈ ∆|X| → R.
Theorem 3 (Existence theorem for finite games). Let G be a finite game such
that each ϕi is attained by a selection function. Then G has a mixed strategy
abstract Nash equilibrium.
Proof. G∗ is a multilinear game which is attained by selection functions by
lemmas 11 and 12. Therefore G∗ has an abstract Nash equilibrium by theorem
2.
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In order to recover the classical Nash theorem we simply consider finite
games whose outcome spaces are R and define qi(π) ∈ R to be the utility of π
for player i, taking all quantifiers to be max. We could instead define a finite
game with single outcome space Rn and let (q(π))i be the utility of π for player
i, and consider selection functions εi ∈ JRnXi maximising the ith coordinate:
εi(p) = argmax
x∈Xi
(p(x))i
However the quantifiers attained by these quantifiers are continuous only if
n = 1. This game has the same equilibria as the equivalent game with multiple
outcome spaces, but the Nash theorem cannot be proven in this way. It is for
this reason that we need to consider games with multiple outcome spaces, in
contrast to generalised sequential games (which do not require continuity).
For a different example of a quantifier in a finite game, let Ri be normed
and fix ε > 0 and x0 ∈ Xi. Define
ϕi(p) = Bε(p(x0))
that is, the closed ε-ball around p(x0). This quantifier is attained by the constant
selection function ε(p) = x0. For a sequential game this would force the game
to be trivial, but this is not the case here: for example, if ϕX is the quantifier
defined here and ϕY is the maximum quantifier with RY = R then a Nash
equilibrium is a point (a, b) such that
|qX(a, b)− qX(x0, b)| < ε qY (a, b) = max
y∈Y
qY (a, y)
6 The normal form of a sequential game
In classical game theory every game can be put into the form of a simultaneous
game called its normal form. The major motivation for definining generalised
simultaneous games was to generalise this operation to give a notion of normal
form for generalised sequential games. This construction is given in this section
and a form of soundness of proven, namely that the solution concept for a
generalised sequential game, the so-called optimal strategies, are mapped to
generalised Nash equilibria.
Definition 12 (Generalised sequential game). A generalised sequential game
is determined by a set R of outcomes, a set Xi of moves and a quantifier
ϕi ∈ SRXi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and an outcome function q ∈
∏n
i=1Xi → R. A
strategy in a sequential game is a tuple
π ∈
n∏
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
Xj → Xi

The strategy π is called optimal iff for all ~a = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∈
∏i−1
j=1 Xj (where
i > 0) we have
q(~a, b~ai , . . . , b
~a
n) ∈ ϕi(λx
Xi .q(~a, x, b~a,xk+i, . . . , b
~a,x
n ))
where
b~aj = πj(~a, b
~a
i , . . . , b
~a
j−1)
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Given a strategy π in a game, its strategic play is π† ∈
∏n
i=1Xi given by
π
†
1 = π1 (modulo the isomorphism
0∏
j=1
Xj → X1 = {0} → X1 ∼= X1)
π
†
i+1 = πi+1(π
†
1, . . . , π
†
i )
The strategic play of an optimal strategy is called an optimal play.
To be precise, this notion of sequential game is called a finite game with mul-
tiple optimal outcomes in (Escardo´ and Oliva 2011). Infinite games are avoided
in this paper for simplicity.
Generalised sequential games were introduced in order to study a particu-
lar higher-order function called the product of selection functions. This is the
function
⊗ ∈ JRX × JRY → JR(X × Y )
given by
(ε⊗ δ)(q) = (a, ba)
where
a = ε(λxX .q(x, bx)) bx = δ(λy
Y .q(x, y))
The product of selection functions has many interesting and unintuitive proper-
ties, especially when infinitely iterated: for example, it computes witnesses for
the axiom of countable choice, and computes exhaustive searches of certain infi-
nite types in finite time (Escardo´ and Oliva 2010b), both of which popular belief
would have is impossible. Every use of the product of selection functions can be
seen as the compution of an optimal play for a suitable generalised sequential
game.
Theorem 4. Let G be a generalised sequential game whose quantifiers are total
and attained by selection functions εi ∈ JRXi. Then(
n⊗
i=1
εi
)
(q)
is an optimal play for G.
Now we give the normal form construction and prove that it maps optimal
strategies to generalised Nash equilibria.
Definition 13 (Normal form). Let G be a generalised sequential game. We
define a simultaneous game with single outcome space
G† = (I†, (X†i )i∈I , R, q
†, (ϕ†i )i∈I)
called the normal form of G as follows:
• I† = {1, . . . , n};
• Each X†i = Pi → Xi where Pi =
∏i−1
j=1 Xj;
• q†(π) = q(π†);
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• Each ϕ†i (p) = ϕi(λx
Xi .p(λσPi .x)).
Theorem 5. Let G be a sequential game and let π be an optimal strategy for
G. Then π is a generalised Nash equilibrium of G†.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It must be proven that
(U iq†(π), πi) ∈ ∆(ϕ
†
i )
Let ~a = (πi−1j=1)
† ∈
∏i−1
j=1 Xj . Since π is an optimal strategy for G we have
q(~a, b~ai , . . . , b
~a
n) ∈ ϕi(λx
Xi .q(~a, x, b~a,xi+1, . . . , b
~a,x
n ))
By induction on j we have
b~aj = πj(~a, b
~a
i , . . . , b
~a
j−1) = πj(π
†
1, . . . , π
†
i−1, π
†
i , . . . , π
†
j−1) = π
†
j
therefore
q†(π) = q(π†) = q(~a, b~ai , . . . , b
~a
n)
We also have
ϕ
†
i (U
i
q†(π))
= ϕi(λx
Xi .U iq†(π)(λσ
Pi .x)) (definition of ϕ†i )
= ϕi(λx
Xi .q†(π(i 7→ λσPi .x))) (definition of U iq†)
= ϕi(λx
Xi .q(τ†)) (definition of q†)
where τ = π(i 7→ λσPi .x). By induction on j we have
τ
†
j =

π
†
j if 1 ≤ j < i
x if i = j
πj(π
†
1, . . . , π
†
i−1, x, τ
†
i+1, . . . , τ
†
j−1) if i < j ≤ n
We certainly have that τ† coincides with (~a, x, b~a,xi+1, . . . , b
~a,x
n ) at indices 1 ≤ j ≤ i.
Moreover by induction on i < j ≤ n we have
b
~a,x
j = πj(~a, x, b
~a,x
i+1, . . . , b
~a,x
j−1) = πj(~a, x, τ
†
i+1, . . . , τ
†
j−1) = τ
†
j
therefore
τ† = (~a, x, b~a,xi+1, . . . , b
~a,x
n )
We have therefore proven
q†(π) ∈ ϕ†i (U
i
q†(π))
that is,
(U iq†(π), πi) ∈ ∆(ϕ
†
i )
The converse is false because optimal strategies of sequential games gener-
alise the classical notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium, which is a stronger
condition than classical Nash equilibrium (called an equilibrium refinement in
classical game theory) (Escardo´ and Oliva 2012).
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7 2-player games and minimax strategies
In this section the abstract notion of a ψ-ϕ strategy is defined, and used to show
an intriguing connection between generalised simultaneous games and proof
theory. The reason for this terminology is that a ψ-ϕ strategy corresponds to
a minimax strategy in a 2-player game with ϕ = max and ψ = min. Note
however that when modelling a classical game as a generalised game all the
quantifiers will be max, and so ψ-ϕ strategies are distinct in this sense from
minimax strategies.
Definition 14 (ψ-ϕ strategy). Let G be a 2-player game with quantifiers ϕ ∈
SRXX and ψ ∈ SRY Y . A strategy a ∈ X is called a ψ-ϕ strategy for player 1
iff
q1(a, f(a)) ∈ ϕ(λx
X .q1(x, f(x)))
for all f ∈ X → Y with the property that for all x ∈ X,
q2(x, f(x)) ∈ ψ(λy
Y .q2(x, y))
Similarly b is a ψ-ϕ strategy for player 2 iff q2(g(b), b) ∈ ψ(λy
Y .q2(g(y), y))
whenever q1(g(y), y) ∈ ϕ(λx
X .q1(x, y)). A ψ-ϕ strategy profile is one whose
components are both ψ-ϕ.
The binary Berardi-Bezem-Coquand functional is the higher-order function
⊗̂ ∈ JRX × JRY → JR(X × Y )
given by
(ε ⊗̂ δ)(q) = (a, b)
where
a = ε(λxX .q(x, δ(λyY .q(x, y))))
b = δ(λyY .q(ε(λxX .q(x, y)), y))
Notice that the type of ⊗̂ is the same as the type of ⊗. Moreover when infinitely
iterated both provide proof interpretations (in the modified realizability inter-
pretation of Heyting arithmetic) of the axiom of countable choice (Berardi et al.
1998, Berger 2002) and a certain equivalence, namely interdefinability over sys-
tem T, is shown in (Powell 2012). However the relationship between the two
functionals is not well understood, and only the product of selection functions
has previously been linked to game theory.
Theorem 6. Let G be a 2-player game with single outcome space such and total
single-valued quantifiers attained by selection functions ε, δ. Then the strategy
profile
(ε ⊗̂ δ)(q) ∈ X × Y
is a ψ-ϕ strategy profile.
Proof. Since ψ is single-valued, the unique f with the given property is
f(x) = bx = δ(λy
Y .q(x, y))
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The first component in the strategy profile is
a = ε(λxX .q(x, bx))
We therefore have
q(a, ba) = (λx
X .q(x, bx))(ε(λx
X .q(x, bx))) ∈ ϕ(λx
X .q(x, bx))
as required. The proof for b is symmetric.
In particular, in a 2-player classical game if a player has outcome function q
then they have a minimax strategy given by (argmax ⊗̂ argmin)(q).
8 Conclusions
For sequential games, the proof of the existence of equilibria uses the product
of selection functions and is constructive (theorem 4). Due to the importance
of the product of selection functions, the constructive nature of the existence
proof is an important part of the theory. Theorem 3 is similar to theorem 4 but
is nonconstructive.
Nash gave 2 different proofs of his existence theorem, one using the Brouwer
fixed point theorem (Nash 1950a) and the other using the Kakutani fixed point
theorem, a weaker form of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg theorem applicable only
to Euclidean spaces (Nash 1950b). Of these, only the second appears to be
amenable to generalising as we have done. The Brouwer, Kakutani and Nash
theorems are all known to not be provable constructively but they all have
equivalent approximation theorems that are provable constructively and are
complete for the same complexity class (Tanaka 2011, Daskalakis et al. 2006).
The author plans to investigate the computation of abstract Nash equilibria in
subsequent papers.
It should be noted that theorem 3, like Nash’s original theorem, has a simpler
proof using the weaker Kakutani theorem. The reason for proving the stronger
theorem 2 is that it can be used to prove a stronger result which also gener-
alises Glicksberg’s theorem (Glicksberg 1952), a result which generalises Nash’s
theorem for finite games to games whose strategy sets are compact topological
spaces and whose outcome functions are continuous.
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